It has been argued that "… trade adjustment in East Asia…will be rapid and sizable, lifting aggregate growth in these economies even as the domestic non-tradable sectors continue to suffer a decline (as in Mexico)" (World Bank, 1998, p.5). Much hope has been pinned on the electronics industry to come through with rapid growth through expanding exports. Two arguments appear to bolster such an expectation: the severity of the region´s currency depreciations has lowered the cost of much of its electronics supply base relative to its competitors; and the electronics industry´s proven track record as an engine of export-led growth shows that it can be quickly started and accelerated in response to changes in the market. However, no export boom in electronics has (as yet) materialized. The paper analyzes what explains this puzzle. We first introduce a taxonomy of East Asia´s electronics firms and market segments to distinguish different capacities to ride out the crisis. We then discuss three barriers to an East Asian export boom in electronics: i) supply-side constraints that result from limited access to trade finance, and from the cost-increasing impact of local currency depreciations in highly import-dependent countries; ii) demand-related constraints, resulting from deteriorating growth perspectives in East Asia´s electronics export markets; and iii) deflationary pricing pressures, resulting from a narrow specialization in high-tech commodities that are characterized by periodic surplus capacity and price wars. Combined, these barriers have produced a vicious circle: once exports increase, net volume gains are likely to be offset by pricing losses.
INTRODUCTION
We now understand well the initial triggers of the Asian crisis that result from an exposure to global financial markets: research highlights endogenous failures of international capital markets 1 and domestic policy failures, especially for financial regulation 2 . It is time to move on to an analysis of possible responses. Elsewhere, I have analyzed how the crisis reshapes the region´s longer-term industrial upgrading options (Ernst, 1998b and 1999c) . In this paper, I focus on short-term responses and discuss a puzzle related to rapid trade adjustment 3 .
A PUZZLE
Both Japan and important East Asian countries are currently in the grip of debt deflation. In a debt deflation, companies devote income to trying to reduce excessive debt rather than spending it on consumption or investment. But what makes sense for individual companies does not make sense for economies. In an economy gripped by private sector debt deflation, activity can be sustained only by expanding fiscal deficits, improved external balances, or both. Most Asian countries do not have the first option, as it is excluded by IMF agreements.
They are thus forced to rely on the second option, which indicates how dramatic are pressures to export one´s way out of the crisis.
It has been argued that "… trade adjustment in East Asia…will be rapid and sizable, lifting aggregate growth in these economies even as the domestic non-tradable sectors continue to suffer a decline (as in Mexico)" (World Bank, 1998, p.5) 4 . Much hope has been pinned on the electronics industry to come through with rapid growth through expanding exports.
Two arguments appear to bolster such an expectation: the severity of the region´s currency depreciations has lowered the cost of much of its electronics supply base relative to its competitors; and the electronics industry´s proven track record as an engine of export-led growth shows that it can be quickly started and accelerated in response to changes in the 1 Stiglitz, 1997; Sachs, 1997; Jomo, 1998; Wade and Veneroso, 1998; and Palma, 1998 2 Chang et al, 1998; Garnaut and McLead, 1998; and World Bank, 1998 b and c. 3 If not mentioned otherwise, data on East Asia´s electronics industry are based on interviews (March and September 1998, and from: Ernst, 1998b . See also Ernst, 1998 a (for Korea); and Ernst 1999 b (for Taiwan) . 4 "Given their deep exchange rate depreciations, EA5 (= Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines) exports are expected to rebound by 18% in 1998 and 12 percent in 1999. Sharply lower GDP market 5 . Since July 1997, the countries worst affected have seen the value of their currencies fall by between 35% and 70% against the US dollar 6 -which in principle should feed into a substantial reduction of export prices. And rapid export expansion in line with shifting comparative advantages has been one of the great achievements of the region´s electronics industry.
However, no export boom in electronics has (as yet) materialized. For instance, Korea´s electronics exports during the first half of 1998, on a year-to-year basis, declined by more than five per cent in US dollar terms (courtesy of the Electronics Industry Association of Korea); and Singapore`s disk drive exports during the first quarter of 1998 declined by almost five percent (again in US-$ terms, courtesy of the Trade Development Board, Singapore).
What explains this puzzle? We first introduce a taxonomy of East Asia´s electronics firms
and market segments to distinguish different capacities to ride out the crisis. We then discuss three barriers to an East Asian export boom in electronics: i) supply-side constraints that result from limited access to trade finance, and from the cost-increasing impact of local currency depreciations in highly import-dependent countries; ii) demand-related constraints, resulting from deteriorating growth perspectives in East Asia´s electronics export markets;
and iii) deflationary pricing pressures, resulting from a narrow specialization in high-tech commodities that are characterized by periodic surplus capacity and price wars. Combined, these barriers have produced a vicious circle: once exports increase, net volume gains are likely to be offset by pricing losses.
A TAXONOMY OF FIRMS AND MARKET SEGMENTS
A stylised taxonomy of East Asia´s electronics firms and market segments highlights a strictly hierarchical industry structure: global brand-name multinationals dominate and shape the development of all the other layers of East Asia`s electronics industry. Clearly, some firms are " more equal than others", to paraphrase George Orwell, in terms of their growth and real exchange rate depreciations are simultaneously expected to cut EA5 import growth to a negative 2 percent in 1998 and to 6 percent in 1999." (World Bank, 1998a, p.6) The concept of an global production network (GPN) is an attempt to capture the spread of broader and more systemic forms of international production that cut across different stages of the value chain and that may or may not involve equity ownership. Such networks constitute an important organizational innovation that enable multinational corporations to cope with the conflicting requirements of specialization and coordination.
The concept allows us to analyze the globalization strategies of a particular firm with regard to the following four questions: 1) Where does a firm locate which stages of the value chain? 2)To what degree does a firm rely on outsourcing? What is the importance of inter-firm production networks relative to the firm's internal production network? 3) To what degree is the control over these transactions exercised in a centralized or in a decentralized manner? And 4) how do these different elements of the IPN hang together? This concept has been developed in studies prepared for the OECD (Ernst, 1994b) , the Sloan Foundation ( Ernst, 1997b) ; and the Brookings Institution 1997 (Ernst, 1997a) . See also Ernst, 1999a. 8 
SUPPLY-SIDE CONSTRAINTS TO AN EXPORT EXPANSION
A very fundamental constraint is that Asian exporters now have trouble finding containers to ship their goods, because so few are arriving carrying imports 11 . In addition, two of the most pressing obstacles are: i) a shortage of credit that results from the devastation of the financial sector -Asian exporters face very serious constraints in their access to trade finance; and ii) the negative impact of devaluation on the cost of imported materials and machinery. The tenacity of the region´s import dependence in electronics becomes clear when we look at the two most prominent success stories: Korea´s semiconductor industry and Taiwan´s PC industry. Despite all their impressive achievements, both industries remain heavily dependent on input imports. Korea´s semiconductor industry is based on an extremely weak foundation, in terms of the materials and production equipment required. Korea's current annual consumption of semiconductors materials is approximately $600 million, with 70% of total consumption being imported (40% from Japan and 20% from the United States). As for the production equipment, 90% have to be imported, with 50% originating from Japan.
Access to trade finance
In Taiwan`s PC industry, a rapid expansion of production capacity and international market share has not been matched by industrial deepening. For most of the key components that determine the price and the performance features of its major export products, Taiwan continues to rely heavily on imports, primarily from Japan. Picture tubes for computer monitors provide an example: nearly two thirds have to be imported, either from Japan or from Japanese affiliates in Southeast Asia. The situation is equally severe for display panels, a key component for Taiwan´s thriving portable PC industry. Taiwan has to import virtually all of the high-end flat panel displays that are used in its portable PCs, and the supply of these devices is controlled by a tightly knit oligopoly consisting of Sharp, a Toshiba-IBM joint venture and NEC, with Hitachi and Matsushita being important secondtier producers 13 .
A high import dependence constitutes an important barrier to export expansion. It implies that local currency depreciations will lead to substantial price increases in key components and machinery required for Asia´s electronics production. For both products, import prices are normally quoted in US-dollars 14 . As a result, the massive devaluation imposed by the Asian crisis has lead to an equally massive increase of import prices, at least for Asian companies that rely on open market purchases (Author´s interviews, September 1998). This is likely to be very different for Asia-based MNC affiliates. Many of their transactions take place as intra-firm trade, where sophisticated transfer pricing techniques can shield these 8 affiliates from an increase in import prices 15 . To the degree that they buy from independent sources, they engage in global sourcing: large orders usually enable them to request substantial price discounts. This is an option which does not exist for most Asian electronics firms, with the exception of some chaebol and some large Taiwanese business groups 16 .
DEMAND-RELATED CONSTRAINTS
The scope for trade adjustment depends to a very large degree on demand-related factors.
This raises two questions: Where are the main export markets for East Asia´s electronics industry? And can these markets absorb a substantial increase in the region´s electronics exports?
A basic dilemma
The outbreak of the Asian crisis has brought back into the limelight a basic dilemma that has accompanied the development of the region´s electronics industry almost from its beginning:
How to balance different markets for its products? Should the focus primarily be on the US and Europe, or should there be a shift toward intra-regional trade?
Initially, a heavy reliance on exports to the US and Europe has helped to compensate for insufficient domestic market size and lack of sophisticated demand; it also helped to insulate individual Asian economies from economic turmoil within the region. Until well into the second half of the 1980s, the lion´s share of these exports went to the US and Europe: in 1987 for instance both markets together accounted for 84.4% of the exports of the four leading Asian NIEs; for ASEAN countries, this share was even higher, at 93.2% 17 . The US market alone accounted for more than 58 % for NIE exports, and 67% for those originating from ASEAN countries -only Mexico, unsurprisingly, displayed a higher degree of US market dependence. Both the Japanese market and the East Asian markets accounted for a very small share of East Asia´s electronics exports. 15 The role of transfer-pricing for inter-firm trade poses serious methodologigal problems for attempts to conduct a reliable quantitative analysis of price effects resulting from currency devaluations. 16 Kim Youngsoo, 1998, provides a fascinating case of the difficulties faced by Samsung Electronics in its attempt to develop a global sourcing network. 17 Ernst and O`Connor, 1992, chapter III, The flipside of this strategy however has been a heavy exposure to the highly volatile business cycles of a handful of electronics exportables. The response to this dilemma has been a rapid growth of intra-regional trade which, especially since the early 1990s, has become one of the hallmarks of the "Asian Miracle" 18 . Two years ago, in 1996, the main concern was a demand glut for DRAM and consumer electronics which had caused a dramatic crash in the region´s exports. Trade regionalization was considered to be a powerful countervailing force that could help to mitigate this fundamental weakness. The result has been a significant increase in intra-regional exports, including exports to Japan.
Intra-regional trade
Over the last few years before the crisis, East Asia has become a strategic growth market for its electronics industry. Table 2 documents that an increasing share of the region´s electronics exports is now staying within the region (exclusive of Japan) Over the last decade, intra-regional trade has made an increasing contribution to growth: in 1996, its share in East Asia´s total exports accounted for about 40%, up from 32% in 1990. If Japan is included, the share of intra-regional trade rises to 50% (World Bank, 1998b) . Trade theorists argue that this reflects the region´s increasing specialization, based on shifting comparative advantages (Balassa, 1977) . The most prominent version of this argument has been the flying geese theory (based on Akamatsu, 1962) . Recent research however has shown that the expansion of intra-Asian trade is due primarily to the spread of increasingly complex global production networks (GPN) (Ernst and Guerrieri, 1998) Similarly, East Asia has become an important source of Japanese electronics imports 19 .
Until the outbreak of the crisis in 1997, Japan's imports of electronics products have been growing very rapidly, and Asia has become the most important source of these imports.
Asia´s share in Japan´s total electronics imports has surged from less than 31% in 1988 to almost 58% in 1996 (Ernst, 1998 WB) 20 . on markets that are highly vulnerable to contagion from the Asian crisis; demand is falling in most of these markets. In addition, a high dependence on emerging markets has three substantial disadvantages: i) there is less pressures to upgrade product performance and quality; ii) there is less exposure to sophisticated customers; and iii) it gives rise to an extreme vulnerability to exchange rate fluctuations. Given Korea´s sticky pattern of specialization, it is no longer possible to claim that Korean firms "make products that sell in the most demanding markets -if the exchange rate is right." (Wade and Veneroso, 1998, p. 1)
The impact of the crisis: East Asia´s shrinking markets
The outbreak of the crisis has again reversed the agenda. Paradoxically, intra-regional trade has now become a liability because it provides a perfect channel for the contagion to spread swiftly through East Asia. The primary concern now is to reduce the industry´s vulnerability to economic turmoil within the region: debates centre on the role that the electronics industry could play in sheltering the region against crisis contagion.
Has there been a shift of East Asia´s electronics exports away from Japan and East Asia, throwing the region back into a heavy reliance on exports to the US and Europe? We still lack systematic trade data for the electronics industry, covering the period since July 1997.
Proxy indicators however clearly indicate a dramatic downward trend in East Asia´s electronics markets. During 1998, the computer market in Asia (including Japan) has declined by 7% on a yearly basis. It is thus safe to assume that electronics exports to the rest of the region will fall drastically, as all of these countries are now struggling with a severe decline in domestic demand, and as most of them lack the financial resources for new investment and imports.
Exports of consumer electronics and of related components are most vulnerable to the impact of the financial crisis, for two reasons: i) East Asia has already substantial surplus production capacities; and ii) demand for these products in EA-5 countries has dropped sharply by about 70 to 80% on a year-to-year basis during 1998. But demand in most of 12 these economies is also likely to decline for computers and telecommunications equipment, given the massive decline projected for capital expenditures in the region.
As Japan is in the throes of a severe recession, its imports from Asia have collapsed: while overall, Japan´s imports fell by 15% (during the first half of 1998), imports from every This, no doubt, is an unfortunate starting-point for the US to absorb an expected export boom from Asia. Since then, the combined effect of the declining demand in Asia and a surging US dollar has produced a further sharp deterioration in the US trade position.
Sooner or later, this may well invite a protectionist response.
In short, Asian economies should not expect too much from devaluation-induced export expansion: there are very little chances that exporting one´s way out of the crisis will produce the expected results. One reason is the familiar trade restriction trap: once a substantial increase in Asian exports would deteriorate the US current account, this may lead to vigorous trade restrictions. A second reason could be a worsening of East Asia´s terms of trade: whatever expansion will occur in its export volume, these gains are likely be more 13 than compensated by substantial price declines. We will now turn to an analysis of such effects.
CONSTRAINTS RESULTING FROM DEFLATIONARY PRICING PRESSURES
Deflationary pricing pressures dominate many if not most sectors of the electronics industry that are of relevance to East Asia. This has given rise to a further set of constraints to a devaluation-induced export expansion: even if East Asian electronics industries succeed to expand their export volumes, negative pricing effects may erase such gains.
It is important to emphasize that local Asian firms are likely to be more vulnerable to such negative pricing effects than MNC affiliates. Established market leaders with a strong global brand image can cope with these pressures: they can charge premium prices, and they can shift the burden of cost reduction onto other shoulders, primarily their Asian suppliers. For the latter companies, this magnifies the pressure to reduce their prices. At the same time, they are under tremendous pressure to broaden their capability base and to increase their investment outlays, simply to sustain their link with their main global customers. There is a substantial risk that, once devaluation is reversed, Asian suppliers will find themselves being caught in a higher-cost production structure than before the crisis. But then they will be unable to back away from the price reductions which they have granted in response to the currency depreciation.
Asian producers of final electronics products are caught in the middle: they must increase hard currency export revenues at almost any cost, in order to service their mounting debt; at the same time, they have to bear the full brunt of this ruthless cost reduction pressure, as they do not have someone else to whom they could pass it on. The root cause of this vulnerability is a narrow specialization in high-tech commodities that are characterized by periodic surplus capacity and price wars 22 . This leaves Asian electronics firms very little room for price increases; there is a constant squeeze on their profit margins, with the result that the funds required for continuous upgrading may dry up even further.
Deflationary pricing pressures on Asian suppliers
How does devaluation affect the prices paid by MNC affiliates to their Asian suppliers? In order to understand this important issue, let us look at the impact of devaluation on the production cost of a Malaysian supplier to a global OEM customer based in Singapore (Author´s interviews in Singapore, March 1998). Most of the materials need to be purchased in US-dollars, due to the very high import content ratios of production; non-material costs ( like labor and overheads) on the other hand are overwhelmingly in local currency. This implies that depreciation should lead to a reduction in the share of non-material costs (both labor costs and overheads).
The Singapore-based OEM customer requests that this reduction in non-material costs be translated in proportional price reductions. The supplier does not have much choice but to
give in to such pressure. Its main concern is to sustain the link with its OEM customer, at almost any cost. Lower-end suppliers, in particular those located outside of Singapore, have been pushed to the limit in granting such price reductions. This reflects the intense price wars in most sectors of the electronics industry (see next section).
This is a very problematic development: it deprives lower-end suppliers of the means that they need urgently for upgrading their product and technology portfolio. Such upgrading requirements are now much more demanding: the dominant global PC manufacturers have drastically reduced the duration of contracts for printed circuit board assembly (PCBA):
typically, PCBA suppliers can now be dropped within a week. PC manufacturers have also off-loaded so-called back-end activities (related to logistics and global supply chain management) to contract manufacturers, in order to concentrate on their core competencies.
This has forced Asian contract manufacturers to move beyond PCBA to the final assembly of PCs (so-called "box-build" contracts). The main concern is to stabilize the link with their main customers: the duration of box-build contracts typically is around six months. This however requires substantial investments which may no longer be possible.
Even more problematic is a somewhat longer-term effect: once local currencies will start to appreciate again, this will leave lower-end suppliers in a very vulnerable position where they will be stuck with a higher-cost production structure that cannot sustain the currently granted price reductions. It is unlikely that they will be able to back away from these price reductions which they have granted in response to the currency crisis. In other words, there is a real danger that current price reductions may force many of these suppliers out of the market.
In short, price pressures which were already intense before the financial crisis, have now become even more severe. At the same time however, Asian suppliers are under tremendous pressure to recapitalize: in order to survive, they need to upgrade their product mix and their efficiency; they also need to proceed with a regionalization of their production base. This dual pressure has resulted in severe cash-flow problems, especially for smaller local suppliers. Asian contract manufacturers are now saddled with a higher-cost production structure than before the crisis, and thus are potentially more vulnerable to its impact.
A narrow and sticky specialization in high-tech commodities
Specialization is an important indicator of the degree of industrial upgrading that a country has achieved. Industrial economists distinguish specialization patterns that reflect differences in the product mix (homogeneous versus differentiated products 23 ), and in the types of production process (mass production versus flexible production). A fundamental problem of East Asia´s electronics industries is a narrow and sticky specialization on a few high-tech commodities (Ernst, 1997 b) that are prone to periodic surplus capacity and price wars. With few exceptions, the region has failed to upgrade into higher-end and rapidly growing market segments for differentiated products that provide sufficient scope for premium pricing (Ernst, 1999 c) .
Take Korea ( Ernst, 1994a , chapters I and II, and Ernst,1998a) . Almost without exception, the chaebol have targeted those segments of the electronics industry that require huge investment outlays and sophisticated mass production techniques for fairly homogeneous products like microwave ovens, TV sets, VCRs, computer monitors, picture tubes, displays,
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and computer memories, especially DRAM. Overwhelmingly, the focus has been on consumer electronics and components, with only limited inroads into industrial electronics.
Burdened with unimpressive "me too" products, the chaebol have all failed to establish themselves as credible competitors in the more design-intensive sectors of the computer industry.
A particularly disturbing feature of Korea´s specialization pattern is that it typically combines high investment thresholds and highly volatile income streams. This poses a considerable risk. For instance, the minimum efficient scale for producing DRAM devices is now more than $1 billion of annual sales. This implies that only firms that have reached the critical threshold of 5% of world production can compete successfully 24 . Competition in DRAM centers on the capacity to invest in huge mega-plants churning out a limited variety of standard products and on the capacity to improve as quickly as possible yields and productivity.
The very high entry barriers typical for DRAM and other high-tech commodities are due less to their R&D intensity than to an explosive combination of high capital-intensity, very high economies of scale and an extremely volatile nature of demand for these devices. High-tech commodities are prone to periodic boom-and-bust cycles and hence do not generate a steady flow of profits. For companies with a high debt-equity ratio, this is obviously not an optimal choice 25 .
Probably the most important weakness of Korea´s semiconductor industry is a very narrow product range. The three leading Korean semiconductor producers are all heavily dependent on computer memories: 80% of Samsung's semiconductor revenues come from memories, and in the case of LG and Hyundai, this share is even higher, i.e., 87% and 90% 26 . Korea's competitive position in semiconductors thus remains highly fragile. 24 For a detailed analysis of entry barriers in different sectors of the electronics industry, see Ernst and O'Connor [1992] . 25 Until the outbreak of the financial crisis, this was not much of a problem. The chaebol had guaranteed access to "patient capital" and ample opportunities for internal "cross-subsidization" and thus were among the few firms world-wide that could cope with the demanding financial requirements of high-tech commodities. The chaebol could also built on sophisticated production and investment capabilities, both in typical mass production industries like cars and consumer durables and in resource-intensive process industries like the steel industry. After the financial crisis hit, this pattern is no longer sustainable. 26 In the case of the largest Japanese semiconductor producer, NEC, for example, only 35% of its semiconductor revenues were generated by MOS (metal oxide on silicon) memories.
The narrow focus on memory products has very negative implications for the overall structure of the electronics industry. Korea keeps exporting more than 90% of its total semiconductor output, while at the same time importing more than 87% of its domestic demand. Such an extreme imbalance between supply and demand makes it very difficult to broaden and deepen forward and backward linkages within the electronics industry and to place it onto a more viable basis 27 .
Surplus capacity and price wars
A narrow specialization on a few high-tech commodities has produced a paradoxical result:
these products are more sensitive to price declines and negative terms of trade effects than labor-intensive ones. Between 1990 and 1997, world prices of high-tech products (based on US import prices) have sharply declined, while those of labor-intensive products were unstable, but did not experience such a sharp decline (World Bank 1998b, chapter 2). And while the average unit price index of Korean exports during the first quarter of 1998 declined by 19.4% from the corresponding period of 1997, much higher unit price reductions are reported for electronics (-38.6%) and semiconductors (-48.6%) 28 .
It can be argued that deflationary price pressures result from persistant surplus capacity 29 : a persistent tendency for production capacity to overshoot demand characterizes especially high-tech commodities that are the strength of East Asia. I illustrate this argument for two product groups that are of critical importance for East Asia´s electronics industry: PCs and DRAM. Both product groups are less vulnerable to shrinking demand in Asia than for 27 It is probably fair to say that Korea's semiconductor industry represents a modern version of the classical mono-product export enclave, characterized by a minimum of linkages with the domestic economy. There is, however, one important difference: the cost for entering the semiconductor industry is horrendously high, and certainly exceeds that of entering the plantation industry (Ernst, 1994 , chapter 2). 28 Bank of Korea figures, quoted in Hak K. Pyo, 1998 29 There is no guarantee that demand growth will keep pace with supply -Say´s law only applies under very restrictive conditions that are unlikely to occur in the real world . Krugman´s claim to the contrary is not convincing. Neo-classical economists claim that general overproduction is impossible: "…all of the increased production in the world has as a necessary counterpart increased income -every dollar of sales must also represent a dollar of wages or profits to somebody. And there are only two things you can do with income: save it or spend it." (Krugman, 1998, p.1). The conclusion drawn is that, short of a global excess of savings compared to investment opportunities, global oversupply is logically impossible. Such a conclusion is consistent with the basic assumptions of the maximization-and-equilibrium paradigm. Yet, it fails to address the existence of persistent overproduction in specific industries and markets, which, as George B. Richardson (1998) has convincingly demonstrated, explains why concurrent coordination is the basic rationale for the existence of the firm.
instance consumer electronics; they critically depend on market developments in the US, and to a lesser degree in Europe.
Pricing trends in PC markets
Since the beginning of 1997, the pace of price reduction has substantially accelerated:
during 1997, the average selling price of a home PC dropped 30% to $1169; by Christmas 1998, these prices are expected to fall even faster, by almost 49% to below $600. Price wars have now also spilled over into the corporate computer market: during 1998, prices for computer hardware (from PC servers to notebooks) sold to private business have fallen by around 20%.
Such drastic price reductions have led to a scissors effect between growth of sales volume and sales revenue: during 1998, it is estimated that worldwide unit sales of PC producers have increased by around 16%, yet US-Dollar denominated sales revenues have increased by only 6.4% (Dataquest figures).
This has far-reaching implications for East Asia´s export perspectives for computer-related products. Export markets are likely to continue their rapid growth, especially in the US and Europe. As the crisis-induced currency depreciation has dramatically improved the price competitiveness of Asian suppliers, much of these new export sales will originate from Asia, provided that supply-related barriers to an export expansion can be removed, and provided of course that there will be no protectionist backlash. Yet, net volume gains will be offset by substantial pricing losses.
At the same time, we witness a drastic change in the rules of competition: cost reduction now needs to be combined with speed-to-market. The result is that Asian suppliers will have to assume most of the inventory risk and the time-to-market pressure by adopting just-intime delivery schedules and by providing one-stop solution packages for global supply chain management. This requires a significant increase of upgrading investments at a time when pervasive price wars result in razor-thin profit margins, and when debt deflation has dried up investible resources.
DRAM price wars and their limits
Korean firms are among the leaders in this important market segment of the semiconductor industry 30 . In response to the demand glut for DRAM since late 1995, Korean producers have shared a common interest with Japanese producers in supply regulation and in the reestablishment of a stable oligopoly. The main objective was to fend off attacks from new entrants in Taiwan and Singapore, and to frustrate attempts by Micron Technology Inc, one of the few remaining US manufacturers, and Siemens, to recapture market share.
These attempts are now in shambles. Since 1996, prices for DRAM have plunged due to accumulated world-wide over-capacity 31 : while the price for a staple 16-megabit DRAM chip in late 1995 was $60, it has crushed to $3 in late 1997, and has slightly increased since then to $3.50. This price is at or below the manufacturing costs of all but the most efficient manufacturers in the industry.
All major DRAM producers DRAM producer are now desperate to generate foreign exchange through increasing exports at almost any cost. There is however reason to doubt that drastic price slashing will be sustainable: the threat of dumping procedures is very real;
and worsening terms of trade will make it more difficult to purchase essential input imports.
A major draw-back is that intensifying price wars will decrease export revenues, despite a possible substantial increase in export volumes, which is bound to further intensify the already severe profit squeeze 32 .
An additional reason why price-slashing strategies are unlikely to last results from drastic changes in the competitive dynamics of this industry. Until recently, the established business model was to increase market share through aggressive forward price reductions based on incessant capacity expansion. This model was pioneered in the 1980s by Toshiba and NEC, and later successfully emulated by Samsung, LG and Hyundai. It apparently has reached its 30 DRAM (= Dynamic Random Access Memories) constitute the largest market segment for computer memories and make up roughly 24% of the world´s total semiconductor demand (Dataquest, 1996) . Intel and other American firms like Texas Instruments and Motorola had originally created the DRAM market. However by around 1986, five major Japanese firms (NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi) had taken over and had established a tight oligopoly that controlled roughly two third of the world market for DRAM. Their share has now fallen to below 48%, and this is primarily due to the successful market penetration by Korean firms. By 1997, Korea firms controlled roughly one third of the global market for DRAM, well ahead of the 20% market share of American companies. This has provoked two types of responses: Within DRAM, an alternative business model is now emerging that focuses on productivity improvements and that tries to slow down the pace of capacity expansion 33 . The main emphasis is to squeeze the remaining profits out of a product at the end of its life cycle, and by doing so, to avoid getting trapped into endless capacity expansion wars. A related response, chosen in particular by second-tier DRAM producers, is to retreat from the general-purpose DRAM market and to diversify into higher value-added, less volatile market segments for specialized memories, ASIC and logic devices 34 .
East Asian countries are weak on both accounts. This is true even for Korea where much talk of radical change, and in particular diversification, has been followed by little action ( Ernst, 1994 Book and 1998 APJM) : Korea´s semiconductor industry is still stuck with a very narrow product range centered on DRAM. There are a few exceptions of successful diversification into higher value-added products. One example are synchronous DRAM 35 , for which prices are about 30% higher than for standard DRAM, where Samsung competes on equal terms with NEC and Fujitsu. But this does not change the overall picture: despite their earlier impressive achievements in rapid capacity and international market share expansion, the Korean chaebol "… are too far behind and too focused on memory products to challenge the overall lead of companies in the US and Japan" (DRI, 1996, p.12) .
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that the electronics industry, East Asia´s traditional engine of exportcourtesy of VLSI Research Inc, a market researcher in San José, California that specializes on the market for semiconductor production equipment, and hence is a reliable source for investment and capacity planning). 33 The new model for DRAM manufacturing has been pioneered by Micron Technology from the US that had earlier greatly suffered from the success of the Toshiba-NEC-Samsung model. Rather than spending billions of dollars to be the first supplier to the market of an accelerating succession of DRAM generations (64 Mb, 256 MB, and 1-gigabit), Micron has optimized its manufacturing process to wring more money from 16 Mb devices. 34 Diversification beyond the DRAM market has been on the agenda already since the last demand glut of 1992/93. Since then, Japanese firms have drastically reduced their reliance on DRAM, and have developed strong positions for instance in specialized memories and ASIC. 35 East Asia`s response to the crisis should not count too much on a rapid trade adjustment.
Reinstating the electronics industry as an engine of growth necessitates industrial
upgrading: the focus should be on improving profit margins on existing sales through productivity improvements and differentiation rather than sharply increasing export volumes. The crisis poses a fundamental dilemma: it has dramatically increased the need for industrial upgrading, while at the same time reducing its chances of success. This precludes a return to the status quo ante -fundamental changes are required in the different Asian development models, and these changes are very different from the ones proposed by the "Washington Consensus", with its focus on orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. While drastic changes in the financial system are important, they need to be supplemented with changes in the real economy: a new round of policy and institutional innovations is required that can help to remove the barriers to industrial upgrading (Ernst, 1999c) .
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The empirical and policy issues relate the formation of knowledge-intensive regional and sectoral networks of firms to competitiveness and structural change. Data on the structure of production will be combined with indicators of knowledge and learning. IO-matrixes which include flows of knowledge and new technologies will be developed and supplemented by data from case-studies and questionnaires.
Theme C: The learning economy and the competitiveness of systems of innovation.
The third theme aims at a stronger conceptual and theoretical base for new concepts such as 'systems of innovation' and 'the learning economy' and to link these concepts to the ecological dimension. The focus is on the interaction between institutional and technical change in a specified geographical space. An attempt will be made to synthesise theories of economic development emphasising the role of science based-sectors with those emphasising learning-by-producing and the growing knowledge-intensity of all economic activities.
The main empirical and policy issues are related to changes in the local dimensions of innovation and learning. What remains of the relative autonomy of national systems of innovation? Is there a tendency towards convergence or divergence in the specialisation in trade, production, innovation and in the knowledge base itself when we compare regions and nations?
The Ph.D.
-programme
There are at present more than 10 Ph.D.-students working in close connection to the DRUID research programme. DRUID organises regularly specific Ph.D-activities such as workshops, seminars and courses, often in a co-operation with other Danish or international institutes. Also important is the role of DRUID as an environment which stimulates the Ph.D.-students to become creative and effective. This involves several elements:
-access to the international network in the form of visiting fellows and visits at the sister institutions -participation in research projects -access to supervision of theses -access to databases Each year DRUID welcomes a limited number of foreign Ph.D.-students who wants to work on subjects and project close to the core of the DRUID-research programme.
External projects
DRUID-members are involved in projects with external support. One major project which covers several of the elements of the research programme is DISKO; a comparative analysis of the Danish Innovation System; and there are several projects involving international cooperation within EU's 4th Framework Programme. DRUID is open to host other projects as far as they fall within its research profile. Special attention is given to the communication of research results from such projects to a wide set of social actors and policy makers.
